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Conflict Prevention in Estonia: 
The Role of the Electoral System 
SERGEY KHRYCHIKOV & HUGH MIALL* 
Department of Politics and International Relations & Richardson Institute, 
Lancaster University, United Kingdom  
Estonias success in averting a potential conflict over its Russian-
speaking minority is often attributed to the intervention of the OSCE 
High Commissioner on National Minorities. Indeed, the Estonian case 
is one of the most satisfactory encounters in the period of Max van der 
Stoels impressive diplomatic engagement. However, deeper, structural 
factors were also important over the longer term. In particular, the vot-
ing system that Estonia adopted, based on the single transferable vote 
system of proportional representation, turned out to be important in 
encouraging political moderation. This article argues that a decisive 
factor in ethnic accommodation was the way the political system chan-
nelled the activities of the Russian-speaking groups into Estonian par-
ties. Other contributory factors were the weakness of ethnic identity 
among the Russian-speakers and international constraints on Russian 
foreign policy. This analysis highlights the crucial role of domestic  
institutions in conflict prevention. 
Introduction 
T 
HE ESTONIAN CASE is often cited as a prime case of effective conflict 
prevention.1 But there is disagreement about the significance of external 
and domestic factors in averting a potential conflict. Some authors stress 
the role of the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) and the 
broader activities of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE) and other external authorities.2 They can point to the HCNMs success 
in defusing the crisis in the northeast in 1993 and securing some amendments 
to Estonian legislation on citizenship and language.3 However, given that a 
large proportion of the non-Estonian population remained stateless after 1993, 
it remains to be explained why the conflict never intensified. 
Others stress the lack of a sense of group solidarity, which prevented consis-
tent political mobilization of the Russian-speakers.4 Although the heterogeneous 
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composition of the Russophone identity is an important part of the explana-
tion, these studies overlook the important issue of why this identity failed to 
develop under the conditions of the groups social exclusion. 
A third group of studies have concentrated on the political mechanisms of 
ethnic accommodation.5 They indicate that the electoral system did moderate 
the political discourse in Estonia and helped to establish stable relations  
between the Estonian- and Russian-speaking elites. However, existing studies 
do not explain how the electoral system established channels for the political 
integration of the Russophones.  
This article aims to fill this gap and to demonstrate the significance of the 
electoral system in the prevention of conflict between Estonians and Russo-
phones in Estonia. We do not claim that the electoral system was the exclusive 
factor that averted sustainable ethnic unrest. Rather, it affected the formation 
of organized political competition, impeded the creation of strong ethnic par-
ties and created space for inter-ethnic alliances. In the Estonian context, the 
electoral system facilitated accommodation of the Russophone elite and inhib-
ited the mobilization of ethnically polarized parties. 
The Conflict Dynamics and the External Intervention 
The Estonian government has been sensitive to descriptions of the foreign  
intervention as conflict prevention. It is, of course, impossible to establish 
whether a violent conflict would have taken place in the absence of preventive 
measures. Nevertheless, a tense situation with a potential for conflict had 
clearly arisen in 1993. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rec-
ognition of independence, Estonia faced a challenging task to establish a stable 
nation-state. Over one-third of the total population of 1.5 million were non-
Estonians. The first non-Communist government, under Edgar Savisaar, took 
an accommodating view towards the non-Estonian minority, proposing to 
grant citizenship based on residence in Estonia in 1990, which would have al-
lowed virtually all non-Estonians to gain citizenship. But, after the attempted 
coup in the Soviet Union in August 1991, the balance of power in Estonia 
shifted in favour of the Estonian nationalists, who were able to draft a more 
exclusive law restricting citizenship to those who had been citizens in 1940 
and their descendants. The Estonian government was fearful that the state 
would not be stable with a minority population of more than 30%. There were 
particular fears about former KGB and Soviet military officers, who with their 
families numbered over 100,000 and were also excluded from citizenship. 
The Citizenship Law, passed in February 1992, required a sufficient command 
of the Estonian language and two years residence before non-citizens could 
be naturalized. This caused considerable resentment among non-Estonians, 
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who saw themselves becoming disenfranchised and stateless. It also drew  
international attention to the situation in the country (as well as to the similar 
situation in Latvia). The status of non-Estonians was a subject of negotiations 
with the Russian government, which linked the withdrawal of military bases 
to the granting of citizenship to all non-Estonians. International organizations 
(including the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the EU, 
the Council of Europe and Human Rights Watch) also expressed concern and 
urged the Estonian government to change its approach. However, the gov-
ernment remained defiant and agreed to undertake only some minor changes. 
For example, an amendment waived the language test for those who had reg-
istered their intentions to apply for citizenship with the Congress of Estonia 
before 1991. The government also granted citizenship for special services to 
about 500 people (leading non-Estonian politicians, artists, academics and 
sportspeople).6 
Remarkably, for more than a year, popular discontent was silent and no  
noticeable collective action took place. The overall feeling of insecurity was 
not converted into mass protest, perhaps because the non-Estonians hoped 
that the dispute would be resolved satisfactorily through pressure from exter-
nal actors. People expected their status to be clarified and legalized. Few non-
Estonians applied for citizenship during this period. (Only 7,571 people  
applied for citizenship through naturalization, and 5,417 of these were granted 
citizenship. At the same time only 30,000 non-Estonians applied for Russian 
citizenship, and 25,400 emigrated from Estonia, mostly to countries of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS].) 
On 21 June 1993, the Estonian government passed the Law on Aliens. This 
was supposed to regulate the problems with the legal status of a large number 
of non-citizens (mainly non-Estonians). In reality, this law effectively triggered 
a political conflict. Its provisions, which were quite mundane in terms of  
immigration acts, proved to be very controversial in the Estonian context. The 
main contention was over the requirement that all non-citizens obtain a resi-
dence permit, which would initially be temporary and would only become 
permanent after three to five years. In the context of radical anti-Russian and 
anti-Soviet rhetoric, in which prominent politicians and leading parties did 
not hesitate to voice the desirability of expatriation of non-Estonians, the new 
requirements were interpreted as a first step towards legalized expulsion. 
Coming on top of other problems, the Law on Aliens finally made people act. 
The local councils in Narva and Sillamäe called referenda on the status of 
northeastern Estonia, aiming to establish territorial autonomy in the area. In 
Kohtla-Järve, despite the presence of a large number of non-Estonians, the  
local administration declined to organize a similar referendum. At the same 
time, the Russian government put enormous pressure on Estonia, accusing the 
country of a gross violation of human rights and warning the international 
community of possible ethnic cleansing. The Russian parliament authorized 
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the government to carry out a range of political, economic and other measures 
against Estonia. In Narva, spokespersons for the Russian community warned 
that there would be mass unrest and armed opposition if the Law on Aliens 
was accepted without change.7 President Boris Yeltsin warned that Estonia 
had forgotten about geopolitical and demographic realities8 and pointed out 
that Russia will take steps to defend its national interests in Estonia.9 
Faced with fierce criticism from outside, and a serious crisis inside the coun-
try, Estonian President Lennart Meri vetoed the controversial law and sent it 
for expert opinion to the OSCE and the Council of Europe. At the same time, 
Estonia accepted the mediation of the recently appointed High Commissioner 
on National Minorities.  
The international organizations identified major shortcomings in the law and 
returned their conclusions to the Estonian authorities. Parliament was recon-
vened and the Law on Aliens was amended on 1 July. It should be noted that 
changes in the law were not particularly radical and applied mainly to the  
appeal procedure and the residence permit reapplication rules. Nevertheless, 
the Estonian parliament demonstrated its willingness to compromise. At the 
same time, President Meri established a Roundtable of National Minorities, 
which was supposed to address the problems of inter-ethnic relations and to 
advise on policies related to these issues. It was also made clear that all per-
manent residents (including non-citizens) would be allowed to vote in the 
forthcoming elections of local councils.  
The plans for referenda in Narva and Sillamäe were pushed forward even  
after the Law on Aliens was changed. Nevertheless, High Commissioner van 
der Stoel managed to secure the agreement of the local authorities to abide by 
the ruling of Estonias Supreme Court on the matter. Referenda were held on 
1617 July, and 97% in Narva and 98.6% in Sillamäe voted in favour of  
regional autonomy, albeit on a low turnout. The Supreme Court duly declared 
the referenda illegal, and the authorities in the northeast did not contest its  
decision. The crisis of 1993 was over. 
The HCNM made two main contributions towards resolving the crisis. The 
first was his recommendations on the Law on Aliens, made a day after the 
OSCE authorized him to act on its behalf.10 These referred primarily to ambi-
guities in the law and deficiencies in the appeal procedure. A number of his 
recommendations were taken into account, and the fact of international  
involvement itself served to ease the tension. The second was his mediation. 
Intensive shuttling between Tallinn and the towns of Ida-Virumaa, and con-
sultations with the Estonian government, Prime Minister Mart Laar, President 
Meri, leaders of the Russian-speaking organizations (the Russian Community 
and the Representative Assembly) and local authorities in the northeast led to 
the key compromise. The Estonian authorities promised that all non-citizens 
would be eligible to apply for citizenship and that the language tests would 
not be over-complicated. The Russian-speaking authorities agreed to respect 
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the territorial integrity of Estonia and to abide by the ruling of the Estonian 
Supreme Court on the referenda. This was the decisive intervention. 
Although the HCNM and other international actors deserve credit for their 
handling of the 1993 crisis, the outcome also demonstrated the limits of exter-
nal intervention. While the HCNM and the OSCE were quite effective as me-
diators, they were unable to make the government change the underlying 
principles of the contested policies. They secured the agreement of the Esto-
nian government to moderate its attitude in the future and to alter some 
vaguely defined articles of the legislation, but this fell well short of what the 
Russian-speaking community was aiming for. The majority of Russian-
speakers had demanded citizenship for all permanent residents, and some 
Russophone political organizations (such as the Russian Community) also  
insisted on legal status for the Russian language. Neither of these demands 
was accepted by the Estonian community or endorsed by the OSCE. 
After the crisis in 1993, the OSCE and other international organizations man-
aged to influence Estonian legislation again, but only after protracted discus-
sions and external pressure. For example, the High Commissioner had raised 
the question of citizenship for stateless children in his first letter to the Esto-
nian authorities.11 But it took more than five years, and the linkage of the issue 
to EU accession, before the government agreed to a watered-down version of 
what the HCNM had proposed. 
Serious obstacles to the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society 
remained. Citizenship was granted only to those who passed language tests 
and met residence requirements. This proved an insurmountable hurdle for 
most Russian-speakers. By 1 January 2001, only 113,764 had received citizen-
ship by naturalization.12 The Language Law made many jobs less accessible 
for people without a sufficient command of Estonian. In February 1998, it was 
toughened to require fluency of everyone working in the service industry or 
with customers.13 Members of the Riigikogu (the Estonian parliament) and  
local councillors were also required to be fluent, a measure that clearly re-
stricted the representation of non-Estonians in state structures. University 
education was switched to Estonian, resulting in a significant decline in the 
number of Russian-speakers entering higher education.14 In 1998, Estonia also 
adopted a new education policy, which envisaged the closure of Russian upper-
secondary schools in 2007.15 Finally, Russian-speakers were economically dis-
advantaged. Erik Anderson argues that Estonian privatization legislation  
deliberately favoured Estonians and discriminated against Russian-speakers.16 
Estonian researchers dispute this and argue that non-Estonians simply suf-
fered from living in areas badly affected by economic restructuring.17 Which-
ever explanation is correct, there is little doubt that Russian-speakers were 
generally worse off, and this too was a potential source of political grievance. 
Overall, the attention of international organizations at an early stage was 
conducive to the peaceful management of the citizenship conflict, and it made 
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the government more cautious and in some respects more moderate in its pol-
icymaking.18 This bought time for the development of an internal solution, 
which in any case was required, as the government was likely to resist contin-
ual interventions by international organizations. The gradual accommodation 
of the Russian-speakers came about largely as an unplanned result both of 
bargaining between political parties in Estonia over the electoral system and 
of the way this electoral system worked in the new Estonian political context. 
However, for the electoral mechanisms to have any effect on the political inte-
gration of the Russophones, a facilitating environment had to be produced. 
One of the key elements of such an environment, international pressure, has 
been briefly outlined in this section. Two other factors also played a role: the 
weak identity of the Russian-speaking group and the inability of the Russian 
Federation to effectively support the Russian diaspora. 
The Weak Identity of the Russian-Speakers 
The failure of the Russian-speakers to mobilize as a coherent political force is 
evidently a further part of the explanation for the averted conflict. As Smith & 
Wilson have argued, diasporic identities may be multiple and fragmented 
and not necessarily coterminous with a community of either resistance or pas-
sivity.19 The non-Estonian community originated from widely dispersed parts 
of the Soviet Union, and there was little to unify its members in the context of 
the Soviet Unions demise.20 Military personnel and industrial workers formed 
two distinct categories. Generation differences became another cleavage, with 
children of industrial workers moving into non-industrial occupations and 
taking on different attitudes as second-generation immigrants. This was, in 
short, a highly fragmented community.  
A number of obstacles prevented a consolidation of a common Russophone 
identity prior to 1991. Institutions that could tie members of the group  
together and link them to a distinctive symbolic system were practically non-
existent. There was no separate church and no common political or cultural 
organizations that could bring the majority of non-Estonians together. The  
institutions that did exist effectively inhibited an identity-building process. 
Local branches of the Communist Party, trade unions and similar organiza-
tions had all been integrated into USSR-wide structures, connecting local  
people with similar groups elsewhere, so that there was no basis for a non-
Estonian identity before 1991. Nevertheless, the attributes that members of the 
community had in common, and in particular their loss of economic and  
political status, could have been the driving force for a mobilization of their 
identity by ethnic entrepreneurs. Had the group been threatened with expul-
sion, as feared at the time of the 1993 crisis, such a mobilization could well 
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have developed. However, after 1993, the political differences within the  
Russian-speaking community and the reduced incentive for ethnic parties un-
der the single transferable vote (STV) system of proportional representation 
(PR) discouraged the development of a mobilized ethnic opposition. 
In other circumstances, a kin state might have supplied the impetus and ide-
ology around which a diaspora group could have mobilized. In the case of the 
Russian Federation, this did not develop, for both external and internal  
reasons.  
The Vagaries of Russian Pressure 
The Russian Federations failure to capitalize on the resentment of the  
Russian-speakers is a further part of the explanation for the averted conflict. 
Russian policy towards the Baltic states went through a number of changes, in 
keeping with the changes in domestic politics within Russia and the changing 
external situation.21 Initially, Yeltsin supported the independence movement 
of the Baltic states as part of his opposition to President Mikhail Gorbachev. 
As president of the Russian Federation, he recognized the Baltic states. The 
Russian policy under Yegor Gaidars government was to recognize the sover-
eignty of the newly independent states and to rely on appeals to international 
organizations to deal with the question of Russian minorities. From spring 
1992, this position came under increasing attack from critics who argued that 
the Russian Foreign Ministry was ignoring the near abroad. In September 
1992, the Foreign Ministry issued a statement that Russia cannot indifferently 
observe and not react to the violations of the rights of ethnic Russians in  
Estonia.22 Not only nationalist politicians but also those who were generally 
regarded as reformers started to argue that Russia should represent the inter-
ests of the Russian communities in the Baltic states and use the presence of 
Russian troops as a bargaining lever. Yeltsins adviser Sergey Stankevich, for 
example, expressed particular criticism of the discriminatory policies of the 
Baltic states and called for a more active stance on the part of the Russian 
Federation.23 Nationalist groups began actively organizing among the Russian 
communities, while the Defence Ministry expressed its commitment to the  
defence of the honour and dignity of the Russian population living in the 
near abroad. By the time of the citizenship crisis, therefore, the defence of 
Russians in the near abroad had solidified into a Russian interest in the eyes 
of the political, foreign policy and defence elites. This explains why the  
Russian parliament was willing to advocate economic pressure against the  
Estonian government in July 1992, and why Yeltsin made threatening state-
ments and linked troop withdrawals to a satisfactory resolution of the citizen-
ship question. However, the Russian government was dependent on the West 
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for financial and economic support at this critical stage of Russias transition, 
and there was no immediate likelihood of the Russian Federation carrying out 
its threats. No practical steps followed from these radical statements, and con-
crete assistance by the Russian government to the Russophone community 
was minimal. After 1993, the official Russian policy of protecting the rights of 
Russian-speakers in Estonia became sporadic and ineffective. 
Several factors prevented the Russian Federation from acting as a powerful 
source of support to the Russian-speaking community. First of all, Western 
governments, especially the United States, strongly opposed any attempts by 
Russia to put pressure on the Baltic states and to link troop withdrawals with 
other issues. In July 1992, the US Senate passed a resolution that tied US aid to 
Russia to the withdrawal of troops.24 Western European governments took a 
similar view. 
The second reason was the political volatility within Russia itself. Internal 
struggle between the president and the parliament, culminating in the violent 
clashes of October 1993, distracted Russian attention from the problems of the 
near abroad. The attempts of the red-brown opposition to capitalize on the 
problems of the non-Estonians and other Russians in the near abroad in fact 
prevented orchestrated support for Russian-speakers. The efforts of Commu-
nists, nationalists and the official government to assert themselves as the main 
protectors of the Russophone communities resulted in chaotic and disorgan-
ized interventions. Different groups within Estonia enjoyed support from par-
ticular segments of the Russian political spectrum. For example, nationalist 
groups linked to the mayor of Moscow, Yuriy Luzhkov, supported one Rus-
sian party, the Estonian United Peoples Party (EURP), while the Council of 
Compatriots in the Duma, led by Konstantin Zatulin, and the Congress of 
Russian Communities supported another, the Russian Party of Estonia. The 
lack of consistent and unified support for the Russophone community from 
the Russian Federation in turn hampered efforts to mobilize a coherent politi-
cal organization for Russian-speakers and was less than helpful in overcoming 
the fragmentation of the non-Estonians. 
Although Russian pressure on Estonia has so far been rather ineffective, it 
has not disappeared. Particular segments of Russian political elites continue to 
make radical statements regarding Estonia, and the Russian government regu-
larly expresses concern about the status of the Russophone minority and its 
willingness to defend this minority. The fact that about 100,000 Russian citi-
zens still reside in Estonia gives the Russian government some justification for 
maintaining its critical scrutiny. This underlines the significance of the domes-
tic political institutions, and especially the electoral system, which have 
helped to moderate political discourse and integrate Russophone leaders into 
mainstream politics.  
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The Estonian Political System 
Considering that Estonia had been an integral part of the Soviet Union and 
lacked many features of an independent state, the speed with which a new 
constitution and state institutions were established was remarkable. However, 
the electoral system had been under discussion since 1989 (for the election of 
March 1990), when relatively free elections were first introduced in the Soviet 
Union. At that time, the only vocal political organizations that specifically 
claimed to represent the Russian-speaking minorities were the Communist 
Party and the Soviet loyalist organizations, OSTK and Intermovement. The 
OSTK favoured a Soviet-style majoritarian system with single-seat constituen-
cies, as this increased their chances of gaining seats in the predominantly  
Russian-speaking northeast. The Communist Party of Estonia (CPE) also sup-
ported this proposal. The Popular Front of Estonia (PFE) strongly opposed a 
majoritarian system, as it lacked the organizational capacity to run an effective 
campaign in all constituencies, especially in rural areas. It favoured a list PR 
system, but also offered to consider a mixed model, which retained elements 
of the majoritarian system but with three seats per constituency and party 
lists. The Communist Party countered with a proposal for a single non-
transferable vote system, with multiple-seat districts but individual candi-
dates, rather than parties, standing. The PFE also refused to accept this option. 
As a compromise they proposed a single transferable vote system, a model 
similar to the one in use in the Republic of Ireland. After some discussions, 
this proposal was eventually accepted. The system has survived with minor 
changes since then, and the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1999 were held accord-
ing to the rules agreed in 1989. The electoral system was devised as a result of 
bargaining influenced by short-term party advantage rather than with a view 
to long-term conflict management. Nevertheless, it turned out to have a 
strongly stabilizing effect on Estonian politics. 
It is worth explaining how this system works in detail to understand its  
effects on inter-ethnic relations. The country is divided into a number of elec-
toral districts (at the moment there are 11 districts, but before 1995 there were 
12) with 7 to 12 seats allocated to each district. Political parties put forward 
lists of candidates. Candidates who wish to run independently submit a decla-
ration to the Central Electoral Committee, and there is a deposit per candidate 
equal to twice the minimum salary (at the moment, about 2,200 Estonian 
kroons, about £120). The deposit is refundable if the candidate is elected or  
receives at least half of the simple quota in an electoral district. Parties rank 
candidates in order of their preferences, and there are two types of lists   
national and local. The national list is in fact composed of the local lists, but 
the rankings may be different, so that candidates placed high up in a local list 
may be far down in the national lists.  
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There are three rounds of counting and seat distribution. In order to distrib-
ute seats, the simple quota (also known as a Hare quota) is calculated by divid-
ing the total number of votes cast in the district by the number of seats. In the 
first round, candidates whose votes surpass the simple quota are declared 
elected. In the second round, only parties that received more than 5% of the 
national vote are allowed to participate. Local party lists are rearranged  
according to the number of votes each candidate receives. The number of 
votes cast for each party in the district is divided by the simple quota to calcu-
late the number of seats each party is entitled to receive. Mandates are then 
given to the candidates from the top of the list, provided each of them man-
aged to receive at least 10% of the simple quota.25 In the final round, the  
remaining seats are distributed between the candidates on the national lists of 
each party. These seats (compensation or adjustment seats) are allocated to 
candidates not according to their individual performance but to their rankings 
in the party lists (those on the top receive mandates), although the 10% rule 
remains valid. In this round of seat allocation, a modified dHondt method is 
used until all 101 seats are filled. 
STV encourages parties to compete for votes across different constituencies, 
and it also favours cross-party alliances and voting for individuals.26 The most 
important consequence of the system was that it encouraged parties to represent 
different segments of each ethnic community and permitted the participation of 
non-Estonians in Estonian political parties. The minoritys representatives could 
be included in majority party lists without the majority parties having to articu-
late ethnic interests at the national level, while these interests could be conveyed 
to the state level through latent communication within parties. The system also 
tended to discourage politicians from resorting to ethnic stereotyping and pub-
lic denigration of other groups. 
Prior to 1991, the Russian-speakers were split into several camps. More lib-
eral-minded people supported the PFE, while those who remained pro-Soviet 
supported either the loyalist organizations (OSTK, Intermovement) or the 
Communist Party. When they found themselves on the verge of disenfran-
chisement after the independence of Estonia in August 1991, the Russian-
speakers had no ready-made organizational structure to speak for their rights. 
The Soviet loyalist groups were banned by the Estonian authorities on  
25 August 1991 for their support of the Moscow coup. The Communist Party 
of Estonia had split into a pro-independence Social Democratic Labour Party, 
which tried to appeal to all ethnic groups, and a pro-Soviet remnant, which 
was later dissolved. The PFE had always been an Estonian organization and 
could not afford to align itself explicitly with the Russian-speakers (although it 
remained the most pro-Russian of the Estonian parties). The main represen-
tation of the Russian-speaking groups in the northeast therefore devolved to a 
new organization, the Trade Union Centre,27 which was supported by the 
Russian-speaking managerial elite and the formerly Communist town admini-
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strations in the northeast. This organization became almost the only forum in 
which the Russian-speaking towns could meet to decide their course of action. 
Moderate Russian-speaking politicians, who used to align with the PFE before 
1991, formed an organization called the Russian Democratic Movement 
(RDM) in Tallinn. A radical group which opposed the pro-Estonian position  
of the moderate Russian-speakers also created a political organization (the 
Russian Community). On 30 January 1993, the RDM, together with the Trade 
Union Centre and some minor organizations, formed the Russian Representa-
tive Assembly, which, however, remained a fairly weak organization.  
In the 1992 parliamentary elections, Russian-speakers could not play an  
important part because too few were eligible to vote. However, in the 1995 
elections after various party realignments a joint Russian-speaking alliance 
(Our Home is Estonia) did quite well, gaining about 62% of the votes of the 
Russian-speakers and gaining six seats in the Riigikogu. However, personal 
conflicts between the Russian-speaking party leaders rendered the group inef-
fective for almost two years between 1996 and 1998. In the 1999 elections,  
although the number of eligible Russian-speaking voters grew by a third, 
support for Russian parties actually dropped. In the absence of official data 
on voting by ethnic group, we have estimated the participation of non-
Estonian voters and the proportion of votes they cast for Estonian and non-
Estonian parties, assuming that a negligible number of ethnic Estonians voted 
for non-Estonian parties (the basis for these estimates is set out in notes to  
Table 1). We estimate that 78% of Russian-speakers voted for Russian parties 
in the 1995 elections,28 and only 55% supported electoral coalitions or parties 
claiming to represent Russian-speakers in the Riigikogu election of 1999 (see 
Table 1). 
Analysis of the electoral data shows that Russian-speakers supported a 
range of Estonian parties, especially left-wing parties and the Centre Party, 
which showed willingness to cooperate with Russian-speakers. The Centre 
Party became particularly important as a political home for some Russian-
speaking leaders and as a vehicle for representing Russian-speakers interests 
(see Table 2). This is evident from an analysis of the election results in Tallinn 
and the towns of the northeast, which shows the strength of support for the 
Centre Party among Russian-speakers.29 There is also evidence of cooperation 
between parties. Prior to the local elections of 1999, the Centre Party signed a 
cooperation agreement with the largest Russian party, the EURP (and did so 
again in 2002). In the local administrations, the ruling coalitions in Tallinn and 
many towns of Ida-Virumaa became coalitions of Russian-speaking political 
groups together with their Estonian counterparts. 
It is clear from this analysis that the Russophone votes were not consolidated 
and that there were several parties for which the Russian-speakers voted. There 
was a clear preference for non-Estonians to cast their votes for candidates with 
Slavic names. But the parties they voted for were not always Russian parties, 
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Table 1. Estimated decline in support for Russophone parties among non-Estonian voters 






Number of non-Estonian votersa 56,584 71,342 135,168 
Votes for non-Estonian partiesb 44,011 (78%) 39,507 (55%) 71,677 (53%) 
Votes for Estonian partiesc 12,573 (22%) 31,835 (45%) 63,491 (47%) 
 
a The number of non-Estonians eligible to vote is estimated by adding the number of non-Estonians who received 
citizenship at birth (80,000) to the number of naturalized citizens (49,500 by 1995; 105,805 by 1999), subtracting 
the estimated number of Estonian-speaking non-Estonians (20,000 Finns, Swedes and Estonian-speaking Jews), 
and subtracting 25% of the remainder to allow for minors and others unable to vote. The number of non-
Estonians who voted is then calculated by applying official turnout figures for the three elections (68.9%, 
57.37%, 50.91%), assuming that the turnout among non-Estonians was consistent with the national average. For 
local elections, the figure includes 71,769 non-citizens who voted (out of an eligible total of 165,031 non-
citizens). The data sources are as follows. For the number of non-Estonians who received citizenship by birth and 
the number of Estonian-speaking non-Estonians: Marju Lauristin, Peeter Vilhalemm, Karl Erik Rosengren & 
Lennart Weibull, eds, Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian Post-
Communist Transition (Tartu: Tartu University Press, 1997), pp. 286, 305. For the number of naturalized citizens: 
Estonian Citizenship and Migration Board. For turnout: Official Data from the Estonian Central Electoral Com-
mission. For non-citizens voting in local elections: Estonian Central Election Commission. 
b These numbers are the official electoral results of the parties or blocs identified as non-Estonian. For the 
Riigikogu election of 1995, these are Our Home is Estonia and the Social Democratic Labour Party (SDTP). 
The SDTP, though not a Russian party, joined the lists of the Estonian United Peoples Party (EURP) in 1999; 
for consistency, its results are added to the non-Estonian parties tallies. For the Riigikogu election of 1999, the 
parties are the EURP and the Russian Party of Estonia. For the local elections of 1999, the parties or blocs in-
cluded are the electoral coalitions Peoples Choice, Peoples Trust and other blocs manifestly Russophone or 
formed by at least one major Russian party. 
c Derived by subtracting the officially recorded votes for non-Estonian parties from the estimated number of non-
Estonian voters, on the assumption that a negligible number of Estonians supported these non-Estonian parties 
and blocs. 
 
but included some mainstream Estonian political organizations. These devel-
opments indicate that national identity has become less important in determin-
ing political affiliations. This is because, on the one hand, access to decision-
making and resource allocation was available through alternative channels to 
ethnic parties and, on the other, the process of building a coherent identity 
and group solidarity was never completed. 
Conclusion 
Our analysis has highlighted the significance of voting across the ethnic divide 
and suggests that the electoral system provided incentives for parties which 
could appeal to both Estonian and non-Estonian communities. Even though a 
significant proportion of the non-Estonian population remained disenfran-
chised in the Riigikogu elections, the party system which emerged has tended 
to favour moderation and discourage ethnic extremism. Had the political  
system been a list PR system, which might well have led to ethnic parties and 
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Table 2. Non-Estonian participation in Estonian parties, 1999 electiona 
Political party Number of non-
Estonians in list 
Total number of  
candidates in list 
Centre Party (Keskerakond) 25  242  
Moderates (Mõõdukad) 15  303  
Blue Party (Sinine Erakond) 13  62  
Reform Party (Reformierakond)  9  212  
Coalition Party (Koonderakond) 9  216  
Progressive Party (Arengupartei) 8  65  
Rural Party (Eesti Maarahva Erakond)  7  166  
Pro Patria Union (Isamaaliit)  2  178  
Russian Party of Estonia (Vene Erakond Eestis)  126  148  
EURP (Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei)b 125  172  
 
a These are the authors own calculations on the basis of the official data available from the Estonian Central 
Electoral Committee (http://www.vvk.ee). The method used to differentiate non-Estonians from Estonians needs 
explanation. Usually (as in Edward Allworth, ed., Soviet Nationality Problems [New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1971]), the surname of a person is used to identify his or her nationality, and the differences between 
Slavic and Estonian surnames are so profound that in most cases this method produces fairly accurate results. 
There are, however, some problems with this method. Owing to the high number of mixed marriages in the USSR 
and other factors, surnames are not necessarily indicative of ethnic origin. There are many people in Estonia who 
have seemingly Russian names while identifying themselves as ethnic Estonians, and vice versa. For example, 
well-known Estonian musician Ivar Must (the composer of the winning song in Eurovision 2001) is an ethnic 
Russian with a typical Estonian name. For this study, the non-Estonians were first separated on the basis of sur-
name. Second, Estonian experts (including Rein Toomla, the leading Estonian analyst on the subject of political 
parties and electoral behaviour) and politicians (including Vladimir Velmann, a member of the Riigikogu from 
the Centre Party) were asked to confirm whether people included in the list were indeed non-Estonians. The sec-
ond stage eliminated several individuals with clearly Slavic names who were in fact Estonians and added others 
with non-Slavic names. Even after these checks, there is a possibility of error; however, these deviations are 
likely to be insignificant. Another study by Toomla (Political Parties in Estonia, an unpublished manuscript pre-
sented at a workshop in Kaunas, Lithuania, 2526 March 2000) produced a very similar result. It may be argued 
that, in many cases (especially when a relatively unknown person with a Slavic name was running for a parlia-
mentary seat), it did not really matter whether a candidate was indeed an ethnic non-Estonian. The possession of a 
clearly identifiable non-Estonian name would probably suffice to influence the electoral choice of many Russo-
phones. Thus, voters could be misled, and a number of votes would be shifted from the ethnic parties to main-
stream political parties.  
b The Russian Party of Estonia and the EURP were two explicitly ethnic parties. 
 
encouraged politicians on each side to take harder positions and adopt more 
intemperate rhetoric in pursuit of votes within their own community, a mobi-
lization of the Russian-speaking community around a defence of its status and 
a more intense and protracted conflict would have been entirely conceivable. 
Another outcome in the internal political struggle in Russia could then have 
led to a very different course of events. The structural conflict prevention  
afforded by the electoral system thus played a crucial role in mitigating a  
potential conflict, although it was also crucial that the political and social envi-
ronment made it possible for the Russophone elite to be integrated into the  
Estonian political system. 
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Our emphasis on the importance of the electoral system does not negate the 
significance of other factors. Without the intervention by the HCNM, the 
OSCE and other international bodies, the Law on Aliens could have provoked 
a more intense conflict than it did, and the Estonian- and Russian-speaking 
communities might have become more polarized. The intervention of inter-
national bodies was also helpful in that it created an environment which was 
seen to reward moderate policies. The relative restraint towards Estonia exer-
cised by the Russian Federation after 1993 was a further significant factor. 
Conditions for conflict prevention can rarely be more favourable than in the 
Estonian case. A highly trusted and skilful intermediary, with the delegated 
authority of the major regional security organization, was fully engaged with 
the conflict. International organizations were able to exert effective pressure 
on the Estonian government, backed up by the conditionality that EU acces-
sion implied. The kin state could not afford to challenge the Western states 
without incurring the risk of serious losses. The potential rebel group was too 
divided and fragmented, in these circumstances, to mount a challenge to the 
state. Such favourable conditions do not always obtain in similar conflicts 
elsewhere. It was particularly fortuitous that the parties in the Estonian  
Supreme Soviet on their own, without external pressure of any kind, arrived 
at an electoral system in 1989 that had the capacity to manage the future con-
flict. Domestic capacity to deal with conflict remains the key requirement for 
effective long-term conflict prevention, but it is largely a matter of the histori-
cal and domestic circumstances within each state, rather than external 
intervention, that determines whether this capacity is adequate. 
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